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CRIMINOLOGY
JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO AGE AND
OTHER MITIGATION EVIDENCE: AN
EXPLORATORY CASE STUDY OF
JUVENILE LIFE SENTENCES IN PREMILLER CASES
JOSÉ B. ASHFORD*, KATHERINE PUZAUSKAS** &
ROBERT DORMADY***
This study describes how judges in Maricopa County, Arizona
responded to age and other mitigation evidence in imposing “life” versus
“natural life” sentences for juvenile offenders convicted of homicide in preMiller cases. Maricopa County was selected for this case study because of
its history of adhering to “restrictive interpretations” of various kinds of
mitigation evidence and because of the characteristics of this county’s local
court community. The study employed a mixed-methods design consisting of
a content analysis of relevant case documents and a quantitative analysis of
the findings from the qualitative analyses of legal case documents. It
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examined 82% of the juveniles given natural life sentences and 72% of the
juveniles given a sentence of life (25-to-life) in Maricopa County. The
findings of this study indicated that judges referenced age as a statutory
mitigating factor in 17% of both “life” and “natural life” cases, and age as
a reason for the sentences imposed in 46% of both “life” and “natural life”
cases. However, the age-relevant and other mitigating reasons referenced by
judges lacked statistically significant associations with the sentences that the
judges imposed. The only judicial reason with a statistically significant
association with the imposed sentences was “emotional impact of the crime
on the victim’s family.” The implications of this and other findings for “full
responsibility” and “mitigation” approaches for blaming juvenile lifers were
discussed, as well as the need for future research on post-Miller sentencing
and resentencing processes.
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INTRODUCTION
Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Roper v. Simmons,1 juvenile
offenders above 16 years of age were subject to discretionary capital
punishment. In Roper, the Court reversed its previous position in Stanford v.
Kentucky2 and held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to
juveniles.3 Nonetheless, the Stanford decision did contain arguments in the
concurring and the dissenting opinions about the need for proportionality
1
2
3

543 U.S. 551 (2005).
492 U.S. 361 (1989).
Roper, 543 U.S. at 574–75.
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analyses addressing developmental differences between juveniles and adults
in deciding on a juvenile death or life sentence.4 Some of the reasoning in
those opinions in Stanford was adopted in Roper,5 which has served as the
progenitor of a subsequent line of decisions in juvenile jurisprudence that
recognize important differences between juvenile and adult offenders in
sentencing processes.6
The U.S. Supreme Court extended its reasoning in Roper to justify the
invalidation of mandatory juvenile life without parole (JLWOP) sentences in
its landmark decision in Miller v. Alabama.7 This decision introduced new
substantive and procedural requirements for the imposition of JLWOP
sentences.8 The Court held that it is unconstitutional not to consider age and
its attendant characteristics as a special status in determining the
proportionality of a natural life sentence for juveniles convicted of a
homicide offense.9
Juvenile offenders sentenced in Arizona prior to Miller sought postconviction relief for the retroactive application of the new constitutional
standards and procedures prescribed in Miller.10 However, the Arizona courts
largely rejected these initial petitions because of the belief that the sentencing
framework in Arizona for natural life sentences already complied with the
Miller decision.11 Retroactivity of Miller was also challenged in jurisdictions

4

Stanford, 492 U.S. at 382 (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also Stanford, 492 U.S. at 393–
94 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5
Roper, 543 U.S. at 562, 570.
6
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010).
7
See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465.
8
Id. at 475–76.
9
Id. at 476–77.
10
See, e.g., State v. Najar, No. 1 CA-CR 13-0686, 2015 WL 3540196, at *1–2 (Ariz. Ct.
App. June 2, 2015), vacated, 137 S. Ct. 369 (2016).
11
See, e.g., id. (holding that Arizona’s JLWOP sentencing structure is not of the
mandatory kind prohibited by Miller because it provides courts an option to sentence a
juvenile offender to “25-to-life” or “natural life.”). Although Najar contended that neither
sentencing option was constitutional after Arizona abolished parole for all offenses, the court
found that the Arizona State Legislature remedied this constitutional defect in 2014 when it
enacted ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-716 (Westlaw through the First Session of the 55th Leg.)
with a provision that allowed parole eligibility for juveniles sentenced to “25-to-life.” Najar,
2015 WL 3540196, at *1–2; see also Michael Kiefer & Jackee Coe, Arizona Inmates
Sentenced to Life with Chance of Parole—After Parole was Abolished, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 19,
2017, 6:02 AM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/arizona-investigations/2017/
03/19/arizona-inmates-sentenced-to-life-with-chance-of-parole-after-parole-abolished/99305
162/ [https://perma.cc/8EKN-W6RT] (discussing how Arizona judges continued to sentence
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across the country.12 The approach of these courts was found unconstitutional
in Montgomery v. Louisiana.13 Montgomery reaffirmed the need for legal
limits on judicial discretion in evaluating mitigation evidence because
juveniles as a class require special consideration of their developmental
status when imposing life sentences.14
Before Miller and Montgomery, there were no legal standards regulating
consideration of mitigation evidence in selecting juvenile life sentences. In
addition, there were no empirical studies that examined how age and other
mitigating factors were considered in assessing the blameworthiness of
juveniles facing JLWOP sentences. One social science perspective used to
guide investigations of sentencing disparities based on sex, race, ethnicity,
and age is the focal concerns perspective first utilized by Steffensmeier and
his colleagues.15 Ulmer and Johnson, for example, write that “[a]ccording to
focal concerns theory, judges and other court community actors therefore
make situational imputations about defendants’ character and expected future
behavior, and assess the implications of these imputed characteristics in
terms of three focal concerns: defendant blameworthiness, defendant
dangerousness and community protection, and practical constraints and
consequences connected to the punishment decision.”16 The focal concerns
theory allows for investigations of variations in the factors considered and
employed by judges when they evaluate questions of blameworthiness.
Notwithstanding the presence and use of this perspective in sentencing
research, there was limited research on how age and other mitigating
evidence were evaluated in local court communities with a history of legal
customs that employed what Atiq and Miller called “restrictive
consideration” of mitigation evidence.17
juveniles to life with a possibility of parole after Arizona abolished parole for classifications
of offenders prior to the passage of ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-716).
12
E.g., Louisiana v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 831 (La. 2013); In re Morgan, 717 F.3d 1186
(11th Cir. 2013) (mem.) (denying the suggestion of rehearing en banc whether Miller is
retroactively applicable in cases on collateral review).
13
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190, 208–09 (2016).
14
Id. at 208–11.
15
Darrell Steffensmeier, Jeffery Ulmer & John Kramer, The Interaction of Race, Gender,
and Age in Criminal Sentencing: The Punishment Cost of Being Young, Black, and Male, 36
CRIMINOLOGY 763, 766–69 (1998).
16
Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian Johnson, Sentencing in Context: A Multilevel Analysis, 42
CRIMINOLOGY 137, 142 (2004).
17
See Emad H. Atiq & Erin L. Miller, The Limits of Law in the Evaluation of Mitigating
Evidence, 45 AM. J. CRIM. L. 167, 170 (2018) (“When a sentencer draws on just one normative
principle, or an unduly restricted range of plausible principles, to explain the evidence’s
mitigating value, they engage in what we call restrictive consideration.”).
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The inhabited institutions perspective, with roots in organizational
sociology, assumes that focal concerns in sentencing are “empirically
indeterminate.”18 The concerns are indeterminate because the perspective
recognizes that the formal rules can be transformed by local community rules
and norms among organizational workgroups and institutional participants.
Arizona is a state court system with a history of adopting restrictive
consideration of mitigation evidence.19 Trial and appellate courts in Arizona
often would exclude mitigation evidence for consideration not on the basis
of its relationship to moral principles of punishment and culpability, but
because the evidence lacked a causal nexus with the crime.20
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found the use of the causal
connection practice in capital sentencing in Arizona unconstitutional in
McKinney v. Ryan.21 This decision addressed existing disputes in case law
about consideration of non-statutory evidence of mitigation when imposing
the death penalty. However, divisions remained among judges on the Ninth
Circuit, as well as among the justices of the Arizona Supreme Court, about
what “consideration” means when sentencing an offender convicted of firstdegree murder. Judge Carlos Bea of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, for
instance, challenged in his dissenting opinion the assumption in the majority
opinion in McKinney that the trial judge had not considered the mitigating
evidence given the fact that the judge when sentencing the offender used the
word “considering” in examining the case’s mitigation evidence.22 He opined
that “giving little or no weight to such evidence [after consideration] . . . is
perfectly permissible under Eddings.”23
The concurring opinion in the post-Miller Arizona case of State v.
Valencia reflected different concerns about the manner in which
Montgomery addressed the degree of blameworthiness for juvenile
offenders.24 Justices Bolick and Pelander argued that,

18
Jeffery T. Ulmer, Criminal Courts as Inhabited Institutions: Making Sense of
Difference and Similarity in Sentencing, in 48 AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND
WHY? 483, 490 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019).
19
See Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 170.
20
Id. at 173–75.
21
813 F.3d 798, 802–04 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc).
22
Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 169.
23
McKinney, 813 F.3d at 843–44 (Bea, J., dissenting); see also Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455
U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982) (finding that a trial judge may determine the weight to give mitigation
evidence in the individualization of a death sentence, but not exclude mitigation evidence from
consideration in selecting an appropriate punishment).
24
State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396–98 (Ariz. 2016) (Bolick, J., concurring).
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By announcing in advance that most murders committed by juveniles “reflect the
transient immaturity of youth,” the Court trivializes the killers’ actions and culpability.
“Transient immaturity” is when my adolescent daughter slugs her big brother. It may
even describe peer pressures that influence reckless behavior. But it is not apt
rationalization for cold-blooded murder.25

A similar viewpoint was reflected in a report utilized by the Maricopa
County Attorney’s Office to contest the science in future cases associated
with assumptions about the diminished moral culpability of juveniles
reflected in Miller and Montgomery.26 Indeed, Maricopa County represents a
court culture with a long history of placing restrictive conditions on its
consideration of personally mitigating factors.27 Moreover, the prosecutors
in Maricopa County have shown institutional rejection of the scientific
evidence relied on by the Supreme Court in Roper v. Simmons, Graham v.
Florida, Miller v. Alabama, and Montgomery v. Louisiana.28
Inasmuch as the Supreme Court introduced in Miller the importance of
considering age and its attendant characteristics when sentencing juveniles
to life without parole, some judges in Arizona have denied post-conviction
relief to offenders on the basis that age was considered when sentencing
juveniles to JLWOP sentences prior to Miller.29 Yet, these post-conviction
decisions came without any supporting empirical evidence of such
consideration of age and attendant circumstances by the sentencing courts.
For this reason, this study examined the percentage of pre-Miller cases in
Maricopa County in which judges referred to age and other mitigation when
giving their reasons for sentencing juveniles to “life” (25-to-life) or “natural
life.” The study also examines the odds ratios of life or natural life sentences
when variables measuring the characteristics of the crime and judicial
findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances were present.
Additionally, the study computes the odds ratios of specific life sentences for
each of the proffered reasons for these sentences and whether age-related
reasons correlated with other variables that show a statistical association with
life sentences in this county.
25

Id. at 398 (Bolick, J., concurring).
Letter from Carolyn C. Melzer, David Salsberg & James D. Seward, The Forensic
Panel, to Deputy Cnty. Att’y Patricia Stevens, Maricopa Cnty. Att’y’s Off. (May 1, 2019) (on
file with journal) (summarizing its review of the scientific literature on questions surrounding
assessments of maturity when sentencing juvenile homicide offenders).
27
See Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 170.
28
See Melzer, Salsberg & Seward, supra note 26, at 13, 18, 140–41.
29
E.g., Minute Entry, State of Arizona v. Luis Alberto Bautista, No. CR 1998-0058756
(Ariz. Super. Ct. July 10, 2013); State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396–98 (Ariz. 2016) (Bolick,
J., concurring).
26
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I. COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF BLAMEWORTHINESS
Mitigating and aggravating circumstances did not become relevant
considerations in criminal sentencing until the emergence of the neoclassical
philosophy of crime and punishment.30 The neoclassical schools of
criminology and punishment challenged legal codes that assume all persons
who violate a given abstract criminal classification are equally culpable. 31
The neo-classicists contended that “[c]hildren, persons under duress, and
individuals who were suffering from mental illness were seen as having
characteristics that differentially affected their moral culpability.”32 This
reform in criminal jurisprudence challenged classical principles of
punishment that originated in the writings of Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy
Bentham.33
Beccaria and Bentham stressed selecting punishments that were
proportional to the seriousness of the offense.34 Their philosophies of
punishment have left an important legacy that continues to influence
sentencing frameworks that give primacy to the nature of the offense in
selecting an appropriate punishment. Beccaria considered discretionary
applications of punishment suspect because they contributed to differential
treatment of persons from different backgrounds and social classes, as well
as excessive punishments that were inconsistently applied to individuals with
convictions for the same offenses.35 Consequently, the classicists

30

JOSÉ B. ASHFORD & MELISSA KUPFERBERG, DEATH PENALTY MITIGATION: A
HANDBOOK FOR MITIGATION SPECIALISTS, INVESTIGATORS, SOCIAL SCIENTISTS, AND LAWYERS
19 (2013).
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS 8, 62–66 (Henry Paolucci trans.,
1963) (1764) (arguing that choice and free will require courts to ignore the offender’s previous
history and any forms of provocation or character to eliminate biases associated with social
status and other individual considerations); Montague Crackanthorpe, Crime and Punishment
from the Comparative Point of View, 3 J. SOC’Y. COMPAR. LEGIS. 17, 18–19 (1901)
(identifying similarities between Beccaria’s view that punishments should be proportional to
the seriousness of the crime and the position of Jeremy Bentham); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN
INTRODUCTION TO PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 178–87 (1780). These two critics
of pre-classical legal codes assumed that justice required adherence to principles of
consistency and proportionality in selecting appropriate punishments. But the treatment of
offenders as an abstraction by the classicists is what was contested by the neo-classical
theorists of punishment. See RAYMOND SALEILLES, THE INDIVIDUALIZATION OF PUNISHMENT
5–13 (Rachel Szold Jastrow trans., 1911). See generally GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY
(Edward Lindsey trans., 1912).
34
See ASHFORD & KUPFERBERG, supra note 30, at 19.
35
Id. at 19–20.
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recommended treating all individuals as equally culpable for committing
specifically defined crimes and their corresponding punishments.36 A
consequence of this opinion was that no distinctions in culpability were
applied to persons convicted of homicide offenses based on personally
mitigating factors.37
The assumptions about moral responsibility adopted by the classicists
“were eventually nullified by juries because they were at variance with
common-sense principles of fairness and the emerging social science
assumptions about human behavior. Jurors in capital cases who were asked
to implement classical principles of punishment observed that some crimes
of murder involved less culpability than others.”38 Jurors were especially
reticent to select a sentence of death in cases involving children and women
because of perceived differences in their moral culpability.39
The prior issues with classical approaches resulted in penal codes in
Europe and in the United States that adopted neoclassical principles of
punishment.40 These newer penal codes did not focus on just fitting the
punishment to the crime, but also on considering the circumstances of the
offense, and the personal characteristics of the offender.41 These
developments in penal jurisprudence introduced important binary categories
in criminal sentencing, “which have dominated the scholarly and reform
epistemologies of the sentencing decision process” (for example, offense
versus offender, rules versus discretion, and consistency versus
individualization).42
The pendulum in sentencing policies has swung back and forth about
how to treat the binary categories of offense and offender even though “‘the
fullest information possible concerning the defendant’s life and
characteristics’ came to define the American approach to sentencing: namely
that ‘the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the crime.’”43
36
37
38
39
40
41

Crackanthorpe, supra note 33, at 17–19.
ASHFORD & KUPFERBERG, supra note 30, at 19–20.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id.; Crackanthorpe, supra note 33, at 19–20.
ASHFORD & KUPFERBERG, supra note 30, at 20; Crackanthorpe, supra note 33, at 19–

21.
42
Cyrus Tata, Sentencing as Craftwork and the Binary Epistemologies of the
Discretionary Decision Process, 16 SOC. & LEGAL STUD. 425, 425 (2007).
43
Brief for The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers & Families Against
Mandatory Minimums as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 2, 14, Dean v. United States,
137 S. Ct. 1170 (2017) (No. 15-9260) (“[T]he punishment imposed must always fit the
crime—and the offender.”); see also ASHFORD & KUPFERBERG, supra note 30 at 19–20;
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Over the years, this viewpoint influenced a number of sentencing policies,
but this assumption about considering offender information in selecting a just
punishment has not gone without opposition from reformers promoting
principles of just deserts (retribution) and proportionality in sentencing. 44
These reformers contributed to the following movements in sentencing that
challenged individualized approaches to sentencing: determinate sentencing,
mandatory minimum sentences, presumptive sentences, and the use of
sentencing guidelines.45 A central aim of many of these reforms was to
reduce abuses of judicial discretion by placing increased attention on the
nature of the offense to ensure consistency in sentencing practices.46
Indeed, developments in sentencing frameworks introduced in the late
1970s and the mid-1980s adopted a narrow view of moral culpability when
addressing questions of proportionality in non-capital sentencing.47 The
result of these sentencing reforms was that many individuals received
sentences for mandatory minimums that did not balance offender
characteristics with offense characteristics.48 When offenders sought relief
for disproportionate sentences (associated with various presumptive and
determinate sentencing practices), the U.S. Supreme Court took a jaundiced
view of performing proportionality analyses when these claims involved
non-capital cases.49 In such cases, the Court chose to defer to legislators about
questions surrounding just sentencing lengths and just sentences for

Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247–48 (1949); Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe,
302 U.S. 51, 61 (1937) (recognizing the need for individual consideration of offender
characteristics in sentencing processes).
44
See Richard S. Frase, Theories of Proportionality and Desert, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND CORRECTIONS, 131, 132 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz
eds., 2012).
45
Michael Tonry, Fifty Years of American Sentencing Reform: Nine Lessons, in 48
AMERICAN SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY? 2–3 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019).
46
See id. at 3.
47
See generally MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING FRAGMENTS: PENAL REFORMS IN
AMERICA, 1975–2025, at 159–87 (2016).
48
See SUSAN EASTON & CHRISTINE PIPER, SENTENCING AND PUNISHMENT: THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE 45–46 (3d ed. 2012); cf. MATTHEW LIPPMAN, CONTEMPORARY CRIMINAL LAW:
CONCEPTS, CASES, AND CONTROVERSIES 44 (5th ed. 2019) (discussing approaches to
sentencing including “mandatory minimum sentences” and “presumptive sentencing
guidelines” that fail to consider offender characteristics).
49
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995 (1991); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277, 289 (1983); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam).

602

ASHFORD, PUZAUSKAS & DORMADY

[Vol. 112

recidivist offenders convicted of a minor offense for their second or third
strike.50
II. CONSIDERING MITIGATION IN EVALUATING BLAMEWORTHINESS
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court found capital
punishment unconstitutional in certain cases, with several justices writing
concurrences to emphasize their concerns about the arbitrary and capricious
application of the death penalty.51 In response, states implemented different
strategies for addressing abuses of discretion in capital cases. North Carolina
and Louisiana chose to eliminate discretionary abuses by making the death
penalty mandatory.52 While this approach addressed the problems of
unfettered discretion identified in Furman,53 the Court in Woodson v. North
Carolina addressed “for the first time the question of whether a death
sentence returned pursuant to a law imposing a mandatory death penalty for
a broad category of homicidal offenses constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment within the meaning of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments.”54 In the Woodson decision, the Court affirmed the viewpoint
that took issue with automatic death sentences for “like legal categories”
because automatic sentences of death do not allow for consideration of “the
past life and habits of a particular offender.”55 Furthermore, the Court
confirmed the need for individualized sentencing in death penalty cases
because of the qualitative difference between a sentence of death and even a
100-year sentence.56 Namely, a “penalty of death differs from all other forms
of criminal punishment, not in degree but in kind.”57

50

See Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 995; Solem, 463 U.S. at 289; Hutto, 454 U.S. at 374; Carol
S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Miller v. Alabama: Is Death (Still) Different?, 11 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 37, 38 (2013).
51
Steiker & Steiker, supra note 50, at 40 (“In the Court’s landmark capital decision,
Furman v. Georgia, various opinions supporting the invalidation of prevailing [death penalty]
statutes condemned the ‘standardless discretion’ of the status quo.”); see also Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 295 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (writing that the death penalty
was unconstitutional because the prevailing statutes lacked sufficient procedure to prevent the
arbitrary administration of capital sentences).
52
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 285–86 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428
U.S. 325, 328–29 (1976).
53
Furman, 408 U.S. at 295.
54
Woodson, 428 U.S. at 287.
55
Id. at 296–97.
56
See id. at 305.
57
Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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The need for considering offender characteristics in death sentences was
further clarified in Lockett v. Ohio.58 Lockett addressed the petitioner’s
challenge to an Ohio statute that did not allow the sentencing judge to
consider and give effect to relevant personal forms of mitigation besides the
presence of a psychotic mental illness or mental deficiency.59 Moreover,
Lockett concluded that trial judges should not be precluded from considering
any mitigating evidence proffered by the defense in support of a sentence less
than death.60 However, the Court in Lockett did not clarify what degree of
consideration of mitigating factors it would require in selecting a death
sentence.61
Indeed, what constituted consideration of mitigation evidence continued
to present issues for the Court in death cases. For instance, the Oklahoma
capital punishment statute did not preclude specific types of mitigation
evidence, which was the problem the Court addressed in Lockett; instead, it
was the exclusion from consideration, as a matter of law, of the background
information proffered by the defense as mitigation evidence.62 The Court in
Eddings v. Oklahoma held that “[j]ust as the State may not by statute preclude
the sentencer from considering any mitigating factor, neither may the
sentencer refuse to consider, as a matter of law, any relevant mitigating
evidence.”63 The principle voiced in Eddings was that a trial judge may
determine the weight to give to mitigation evidence in the individualization
of a death sentence, but not exclude mitigation evidence from consideration
in selecting an appropriate punishment.64 In spite of the decisions in Eddings,
Lockett, and Woodson, the Court continued to encounter frameworks
whereby the decision process did not allow for consideration of all mitigation
evidence in proportionality assessments of an offender’s moral culpability in
capital cases.65
Associate Justice O’Connor introduced in Franklin v. Lynaugh a
conceptualization of diminished moral culpability that was eventually

58

See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 603 (1978).
Id. at 594.
60
Id. at 604.
61
Id.
62
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 109–10 (1982).
63
Id. at 113–14.
64
See id.
65
Id. at 111–14 (recognizing statutory and discretionary barriers to considering mitigation
evidence in Woodson and subsequent cases); Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 170–71.
59
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applied to persons with intellectual disabilities and juveniles as a class.66
Justice O’Connor wrote:
“Evidence about the defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the
belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are
attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may
be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse . . . . Thus, the sentence
imposed at the penalty stage should reflect a reasoned moral response to the defendant’s
background, character, and crime.”67

In Justice O’Connor’s view, assessments of culpability required
consideration of other types of mitigation besides the circumstances of the
offense, the offender’s record, and the offender’s character.68 O’Connor’s
dissent in Enmund v. Florida also reiterated the reasoning in Franklin that an
individualized assessment of “proportionality requires a nexus between the
punishment and the defendant’s blameworthiness.”69 In Enmund, she
concluded that the diminished moral culpability of persons with intellectual
disabilities required an individualized assessment of the connection between
the offender’s intellectual disabilities and the offender’s personal
culpability.70
The current criminal justice process incorporates many different
conceptualizations of blameworthiness.71 Insofar as individualized
assessments of culpability are required in death and JLWOP cases,
presumptive sentencing frameworks typically require the sentencer to
consider the offense, its circumstances, and the offender’s criminal record in
determining the offender’s culpability.72 In these frameworks, the sentencer
can also consider evidence for deciding mitigated and aggravated sentences,
which was also true of the sentencing framework employed in Arizona prior
66

Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 184 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see also
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (finding that the imposition of the death penalty
on an intellectually disabled offender is unconstitutional because it violated the Eighth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).
67
Franklin, 487 U.S. at 184 (quoting California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987)
(O’Connor, J., concurring)).
68
Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring).
69
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 825 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
70
See id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
71
Some sentencing frameworks in the social science literature have adopted definitions
of culpability that focus primarily on offense characteristics with minimal consideration of the
contribution of personal mitigating factors. For instance, the Focal Concerns framework
operationalized blameworthiness as representing the seriousness of the offender’s crime and
the offender’s criminal history. See Steffensmeier, Ulmer & Kramer, supra note 15, at 766.
72
Richard S. Frase, Forty Years of American Sentencing Guidelines, in 48 AMERICAN
SENTENCING: WHAT HAPPENS AND WHY? 88–90 (Michael Tonry ed., 2019).
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to Miller.73 In life imprisonment sentencing cases, Arizona law prior to Miller
required the judge to consider fourteen aggravating factors and five
mitigating factors.74 Age was the fifth statutory mitigating factor listed
among the state’s statutory mitigating circumstances.75 Yet, the way in which
age was evaluated in the mitigation context lacks close empirical scrutiny
and case law prior to Miller did not require judges to consider youth and its
attendant characteristics in their evaluations of age as a mitigating factor.
Evaluations of these attendant characteristics were left to the discretion of the
sentencer.76
Miller reaffirmed the important developmental differences between
juvenile and adult offenders previously articulated in Roper77 and Graham.78
These differences specifically pertain to the level of culpability that should
be attributed to juvenile offenders vis-à-vis adult offenders when making
sentencing decisions. Associate Justice Kagan wrote:
Those cases [Roper and Graham] relied on three significant gaps between juveniles
and adults. First, children have a “lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of
responsibility,” leading to recklessness, impulsivity, and headless risk-taking. Roper,
543 U.S. at 569, 125 S. Ct. 1183. Second, children “are more vulnerable . . . to negative
influences and outside pressures,” including from their family and peers; they have
limited “contro[l] over their own environment” and lack the ability to extricate
themselves from horrific, crime-producing settings. Ibid. And third, a child’s character
is not as “well formed” as an adult’s; his traits are “less fixed” and his actions less likely
to be “evidence of irretrievabl[e] deprav[ity].” Id. at 570.79

Consequently, the Court concluded that sentencers needed to evaluate
whether the crime reflected a juvenile’s transient immaturity or their
irreparable corruption in deciding whether a juvenile deserved a JLWOP
sentence.80 Indeed, the Court held in Miller that the qualities that diminish a
juvenile’s culpability cannot be ignored when selecting a sentence of natural
life.81

73

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (Westlaw through the First Session of the 55th Leg.).
Id.
75
Id. The Arizona code specifies that in deciding on a sentence the judge “shall take into
account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that have been proven.” Id. These
principles in deciding a sentence also apply in death sentences. Id.
76
See id.
77
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
78
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68 (2010).
79
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012).
80
Id. at 479–80.
81
Id. at 481–83.
74
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The purpose of this study was to examine whether judges were adopting
a “full responsibility,” or a “mitigation model” for blaming juveniles as
advanced by Scott and Steinberg.82 These authors contended that
contemporary practices in criminal law departed from an excuse-based
approach employed prior to the 1980s for addressing juvenile crime to a fullresponsibility approach.83 In full-responsibility approaches, the analyses of
juvenile blameworthiness did not recognize the diminished culpability of
youth and treated juveniles like adults in criminal sentencing processes. 84
Consequently, Maricopa County provided a perfect opportunity for exploring
how judges responded to age as a proxy for considering the diminished
culpability of juveniles in pre-Miller cases because it did not have mandatory
life sentences for juvenile homicide offenders. Additionally, Maricopa
County employed individualized sentencing for juveniles convicted of a
homicide offence and judges were required to consider the defendant’s age
in selecting an appropriate punishment. Yet Maricopa has had a history of
legal challenges because of restrictive interpretations of mitigation
evidence.85 For these reasons, we described associations among age-related
and other mitigating factors to determine the role of a mitigation approach,
or lack thereof, when judges from a court community with a history of
restrictive interpretations of mitigation evidence sentenced pre-Miller
juveniles to 25-to-life or JLWOP sentences.
III. METHODS
A. RESEARCH PROCEDURES

We examined the formal documents in the legal case files of juvenile
lifers in Maricopa County, Arizona who granted researchers permission to
obtain documents for review from the Clerk of the Courts. The study
employed a mixed-methods design consisting of a content analysis of the
relevant documents and a quantitative analysis of the findings from the
content analysis. Mark Hall and Ronald Wright have referred to this method

82

Elizabeth S. Scott & Laurence Steinberg, Blaming Youth, 81 TEX. L. REV. 799, 800, 829
(2003).
83
Id.
84
See id. at 833. Scott and Steinberg introduced a framework that clarified how
immaturity mitigates the blameworthiness of juveniles. Id. This framework’s approach to the
diminished culpability of juveniles as a class is reflected in the Miller decision. See Miller,
567 U.S. at 479–80.
85
See Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 170.
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in legal scholarship as “Systematic Content Analysis.”86 Hall and Wright
contend that content analysis “could form the basis for a uniquely legal
empirical methodology.”87 Moreover, it is their contention that content
analysis is a valuable addition to legal scholarship because it offers
opportunities for “objective, falsifiable, and reproducible knowledge.”88
Content analysis is also widely employed in criminology, criminal justice,
political science and sociological research.89
This study coded content in each case file. The coders of the relevant
documents were law and graduate social work students. Before becoming a
coder for the study, each student coded two pilot cases and had to meet a
standard of reliability in completing the coding instrument of eighty percent
or higher. The percent agreement of coders calculated across items after
training for this phase of the process was ninety-three percent. Two coders
were then assigned to each case and the lead researcher checked for any
differences in judgements on subsequently coded items. The coders revisited
the cases to develop a consensus about the correct interpretation when
differences were identified. Variables with low reliabilities were eliminated
from the study when we initially coded for inter-rater-reliability.90
Information examined in the study was contained in different parts of
the case files. For this reason, students had a list of documents for the review
of a defendant’s case file. The list of documents included content on
characteristics of the offense (indictment, arraignment, state’s complaint and
initial charges, other charging documents, and presentence investigation);
judicial findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances (sentencing
hearing transcripts, plea and change of plea documents); and reasons for
sentence (copies of sentencing judgment and reasons for the sentence
proffered by the judge).

86

See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 64–66 (2008).
87
Id. at 64.
88
Id.
89
Id. at 63; see MICHAEL G. MAXFIELD & EARL R. BABBIE, BASICS OF RESEARCH METHODS
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CRIMINOLOGY 197 (4th ed. 2016) (discussing the use of content
analysis in many of the social sciences). Hall and Wright also describe that content analysis is
an accepted method employed by political scientists and sociologists. Hall & Wright, supra
note 86, at 64.
90
Students were asked to determine whether the offense was premeditated. This variable
only achieved sixty percent agreement across coders. For this reason, it was eliminated from
the study’s analysis.
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B. CONTEXT

Maricopa County is the fourth largest county in the United States.91 It
covers 9,200.14 square miles and has a population of about 4,496,588 as of
2021.92 It has more than half of Arizona’s population. Eighty-five percent of
all the juveniles serving life without parole were convicted in Maricopa and
Pima Counties.93 Arizona eliminated parole for all offenders on January 1,
1994 under ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1604.09.94 However, the Arizona
Legislature passed House Bill 2593 after the Miller decision, which made
juveniles eligible for release after 25 to 35 years, depending on the age of the
victim.95 The juvenile offenders serving life sentences in Arizona were
identified by the Arizona Justice Project post-Miller in an effort to assist
juveniles serving 25-to-life sentences to obtain a meaningful opportunity for
release from prison, and to assist natural lifers pursuing opportunities for
resentencing.96 The list of these offenders was provided to the researchers for
the purposes of this study. Only the names of juvenile offenders who
consented to be involved in the study were provided.
Former Maricopa County Attorney Allister Adel commented in a 2019
article that Arizona has the fourth highest rate of incarceration in the United
States.97 The Fair Punishment Project also identified Maricopa County as one
91

Maricopa County Quick Facts, MARICOPA CNTY., https://www.maricopa.gov/3598/
County-Quick-Facts [https://perma.cc/R6HD-SFDN].
92
Quick Facts: Maricopa County, Arizona, US CENSUS (July 1, 2021), https://www
.census.gov/quickfacts/maricopacountyarizona [https://perma.cc/XD5F-AHJY].
93
A State-By-State Look at Juvenile Life Without Parole, ASSOCIATED PRESS (July 31,
2017), https://apnews.com/article/9debc3bdc7034ad2a68e62911fba0d85.
94
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1604.09 (1994).
95
H.R. 2593, 51st Leg., 2d Reg. Sess., 2014 Ariz. Sess. Laws 1140; Kiefer & Coe, supra
note 11; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751–13-752 (Westlaw through First Session of the 55th
Leg.).
96
The Arizona Justice Project takes cases of actual innocence or wrongful conviction and
cases of some clear manifest injustice in sentencing. It has a special component providing
legal assistance in Miller cases. ARIZ. JUST. PROJ., https://www.azjusticeproject.org/missionand-vision [https://perma.cc/RYU9-BAF4]; José B. Ashford & Husain Lateef, Field Note—
Serving Miller Youth: An Interprofessional Initiative for Educating Law and Social Work
Students, 57 J. SOC. WORK EDUC., 405, 407–08 (2021) (discussing the special component
providing assistance to juvenile lifers seeking release to the community before the parole
board).
97
Jeremy Duda, Top Maricopa County Prosecutor Open to Justice Reform, But
Noncommittal on Specifics, ARIZ. MIRROR (Dec. 16, 2019, 3:01 PM), https://www.azmirror.
com/2019/12/16/allister-adel-open-to-justice-reform-but-noncommittal-on-specifics/ [https://
perma.cc/SLQ5-BGLD]; see also Arizona’s Imprisonment Crisis: The High Price of Prison
Growth, FWD.US (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.fwd.us/news/arizona-imprisonment-crisispart-1/ [https://perma.cc/YA4U-3AAX].
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of the outlier death penalty counties given that its prosecutors seek the death
penalty at one of the highest rates in the country.98 Moreover, “70 percent of
cases that the Arizona Supreme Court decided on direct appeal since 2006
involve defendants with the type of severe mitigation evidence that strongly
suggests excessive punishment.”99 The Fair Punishment Project supported
the prior observation about the harsh and excessive nature of punishments in
Maricopa County by citing types of mitigation evidence in cases that sought
relief from their excessive sentences. The Fair Punishment Project gave as
one example, “11 percent of the cases involved a defendant not old enough
to buy a beer.”100 The prior indicators of the presence of punitive customs in
Arizona toward juveniles and other offenders suggests that the legal culture
in Arizona might conflict with Justice Kagan’s conclusion that because
juveniles as a class have diminished culpability and hold increased prospects
for reform, “they are less deserving of the most severe punishments.”101
Moreover, many of the scientific arguments supporting the diminished
culpability of juvenile offenders were challenged in a report that prosecuting
attorneys in Maricopa County have introduced to rebut evidence of
immaturity proffered by defense attorneys in sentencing, resentencing, and
clemency hearings.102 This report authored by The Forensic Panel on
homicide and immaturity focuses primarily on connecting the person’s
background and other types of mitigation evidence to the crime rather than
the questions of desert or moral culpability.103 This report did not accept the
principle that most juveniles are less deserving of JLWOP sentences than
adults.104 Indeed, a consistent theme throughout this report was that homicide
offenses require culpability assessments that focus on the nexus between the
mitigation evidence and the crime regardless of whether the offender is an

98
Ray Stern, Harvard Death-Penalty Study Rips Maricopa County Prosecutors, PHX.
NEW TIMES (Aug. 23, 2016, 2:27 PM), https://www.phoenixnewtimes.com/news/harvarddeath-penalty-study-rips-maricopa-county-prosecutors-8563756.
99
FAIR PUNISHMENT PROJECT, TOO BROKEN TO FIX: PART I, at 12 (2016), https://files.death
penaltyinfo.org/documents/FairPunishmentProject-TooBroken_2016-08.pdf [https://perma
.cc/4K5F-YSLR].
100
Id. at 12.
101
Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471 (2012) (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48,
68 (2010)). Justice Kagan also said that the Court’s prior conclusions about juveniles as a class
was predicated not only on common sense, but also on science. Id. at 471–72 (citing Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005)).
102
Melzer, Salsberg & Seward, supra note 26, at 56–63.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 141.
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adult or juvenile.105 In addition, much of the forensic wisdom proffered in
this report recommends identifying variables associated with the mitigation
of criminal responsibility or guilt and not the mitigation of moral culpability
and punishment.106 The authors wrote that these variables “impact
consideration of whether a murder is borne of immaturity or a maturity no
different from others who murder. . . . Ultimately, however, murder is too
heterogeneous a crime to allow presumption based on age alone.”107 Thus,
this report solicited by prosecutors in Maricopa County is consistent with a
“bottom up” interpretation of age as a mitigating circumstance that conflicts
with what sociologists would consider “[a] top down [view]” of the role of
age in sentencing reflected in Miller and Montgomery.108
We selected Maricopa County to complete this study because it
represents an organizational field within a specific court culture that adheres
to restrictive interpretations of mitigation evidence.109 After the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals found the causal nexus test unconstitutional in McKinney
v. Ryan, the state requested that the Arizona Supreme Court perform an
independent review of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in this
case.110 The Arizona Supreme Court “granted the State’s motion to conduct
a new independent review of McKinney’s death sentences.”111 Justice Gould
wrote the opinion in this case and reaffirmed the need for considering and
weighing:

105

Id. at 141.
Id. at 56–63.
107
Id. at 7.
108
Ulmer, supra note 18, at 483.
109
See, e.g., McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 805, 821–22 (2015). An organizational
field refers to “‘sets of interacting groups, organizations, and agencies oriented around a
common . . . interest.’ They are bounded by the presence of a common regulatory system or
shared normative (systems of formal or informal social norms) or cultural cognitive
frameworks (systems of cultural and cognitive meanings).” Jeffery T. Ulmer & Brian D.
Johnson, Organizational Conformity and Punishment: Federal Court Communities and
Judge-Initiated Guidelines Departures, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 257 (2017)
(quoting HOWARD E. ALDRICH & MARTIN REUF, ORGANIZATIONS EVOLVING 40 (2d ed. 2006)).
110
State v. McKinney, 426 P.3d 1204, 1206 (Ariz. 2018).
111
Id. at 1205.
106
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[A]ll mitigation evidence regardless of whether it bears a causal nexus to the underlying
murders. State v. Newell, 212 Ariz. 389, 405 ¶ 82, 132 P.3d 833, 849
(2006) . . . However, the lack of “a causal connection may be considered in assessing
the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence.” Newell, 212 Ariz. at 405 ¶ 82, 132
P.3d at 849; cf. Eddings, 455 U.S. at 114-15, 102 S. Ct. 869 (“The sentencer, and the
Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant
mitigating evidence.”).112

Clearly, the causal nexus principle has continued to play a significant
role in the evaluation of mitigation evidence in adult death cases in Arizona.
However, it is unclear if the courts in Arizona have adopted a similar
framework when evaluating age as a mitigating factor in pre-Miller cases.
We assumed that the courts in Maricopa County, like courts in other counties,
must negotiate the formally-structured rules of the U.S. Supreme Court and
the evolving standards of a society with the informal normative expectations
of its own court culture.113 In keeping with this assumption, we wanted to
describe how the Maricopa County courts negotiated customs and informal
expectations in considering age and other mitigation evidence when deciding
juvenile life sentences prior to Miller.114 By doing so, we can discern if the
court culture in Arizona did see important differences between adults and
juveniles in assessing issues of culpability when considering questions of age
in deciding on appropriate sentences prior to the Miller decision.
C. PARTICIPANTS

There were twenty-three male juveniles given natural life sentences in
Maricopa County, Arizona prior to the Miller decision. No females had a
natural life sentence. The researchers obtained consents from nineteen (82%)
of the pre-Miller juveniles serving natural life sentences from Maricopa
County, Arizona to review their case files. We also requested permission to
review the case files of juveniles who received a sentence of 25-to-life prior
to Miller. There were twenty-five male juveniles in Maricopa County with a
25-to-life sentence. We did not include females in the 25-to-life sample
because only one female received a sentence of 25-to-life. Eighteen (72%) of
the population of males serving a 25-to-life sentence agreed to allow us to
review their case files for the purposes of this study.
The average age of the 25-to-life group at the time of their respective
offense(s) was 16.22. The 25-to-life group had a racial make-up of 16.7%

112
113
114

Id. at 1206.
See generally Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 16, at 490.
See generally Ulmer & Johnson, supra note 16, at 486–87.
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non-minority and 83.3% minority group membership.115 This group had
88.9% of its offenders with a charge of first-degree murder and 5.6% had a
charge of felony murder as their most serious offense. The prosecutor sought
death in 16.7% of the cases for this group. Twenty-two percent of these 25to-life sentences resulted from a plea-bargain. The average number of
felonies besides the homicide offense for the 25-to-life group was 1.18 and
the average number of victims was 1.18. The mean number of perpetrators
for the 25-to-life group was 2.28, and membership in a gang for this group
was 22.2%.
The average age of the group receiving a natural life sentence was 16.16.
The non-minority group received the highest percentage of natural life
sentences, 52.6%, whereas the minority group had 47.4% of the natural life
sentences. For type of homicide or most serious charge, the natural life group
had a charge of first-degree murder in 89.5% of the cases and a charge of
felony murder in 10.5% of the cases. Prosecutors sought death in 33.3% of
the cases in this group and a natural life sentence resulted from a plea-bargain
in 32% of the cases.116 The mean number of other felonies besides a charge
of murder was 2.53 and the number of victims for this group had a mean of
1.16. The average number of perpetrators was 2.63 and membership in a gang
for this group was 31.3%. The sizes of our two samples were reasonably
representative of the study’s target populations.117

115

Insofar as 16.7% of the White juveniles received a sentence of 25-to-life, larger
percentages of the minority group offenders received a sentence of 25-to-life: African
American offenders 44.4% and Latino offenders 38.9%. When we examined the statistical
association for the overall racial/ethnic measure, it was not statistically significant (Phi=329,
p=.135). However, there was a statistically significant difference between minority and nonminority youth (Phi=-.328, p=.046), but this finding was not supported by the results for the
odds ratio computed to evaluate this association OR .22 95 CI (.05-1.03). That is, the
confidence interval crossed one and did not meet the established confidence interval of 95%.
Nonetheless, this finding indicates that the odds of a minority group member receiving a
natural life sentence was 78% less than for a non-minority group member.
116
The overall number of sentences due to a plea bargain was twenty-seven percent. There
was no statistically significant association between the type of life sentence and whether the
sentence went to trial or a plea bargain.
117
We limited our analysis to Maricopa County because we did not receive sufficient
consents to have a representative sample of juveniles sentenced across Arizona. For this
reason, we decided to perform a case study of pre-Miller cases in Maricopa County, Arizona.
The protocol for this study and its measures were approved by the University’s Institutional
Review Board.
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D. MEASURES

We used the information in charging documents and presentence reports
to code seventeen dichotomous variables to describe the characteristics of
the offense.118 Information in the sentencing hearing documents were
employed to code fourteen variables that described judicial findings for any
statutorily specified aggravating circumstances. The statutory aggravating
circumstances examined in this study are described in ARIZ. REV. STAT.
§ 13-751 for sentences of death or life in prison.119 The five statutory
mitigating circumstances were: (1) the defendant’s capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements
of law; (2) the defendant was under substantial duress; (3) relatively minor
participation in the offense; (4) did not know the likelihood of causing the
harm; and (5) age.120 (The only variables actually included in the subsequent
data analyses had to have responses in at least 5% of the cases).
Initially, sentencing transcripts were coded to construct measures for the
non-statutory mitigating circumstances. The initial categories for coding the
documents were taken from the literature and a review of a small sample of
cases. The next phase of the process involved reclassifying the initial
categories of information found in the documents into similar themes. In this
phase of the process, two professionals with experience with Miller cases
reclassified the initial information into six themes that represented the nonstatutory variables examined in this study: circumstances of the offense;
sentencing considerations; mental health considerations; brain/cognitive
developmental considerations; family environment considerations; and
social connection/disconnection.121 The coders achieved 83% agreement for
118

We used ones and zeros to capture the group membership of sixteen dichotomous
variables measuring offense characteristics. The victim’s race was not included in the final
analyses because for the majority of the cases the race of the victim was missing. We also
attempted to locate the victim’s race by reviewing newspaper accounts of the offense, but were
unable to do so.
119
These aggravating circumstances were coded No=0 , Yes=1: (1) convicted of another
offense with a sentence of life or death; (2) prior conviction of serious offense; (3) knowingly
created a grave risk; (4) procured to commit offense; (5) pecuniary gain; (6) especially
heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; (7) convicted of one or more homicide; (8) victim under
15; (9) victim unborn child; (10) victim peace officer; (11) promote objectives of street gang;
(12) prevent cooperation with law enforcement or with other criminal justice process; (13)
used remote stun gun; and (14) victim an elder.
120
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-751 (Westlaw through the First Session of the 55th Leg.).
121
The definitions and indicators that represent each of these variables were: (1)
Circumstances of the offense are specific offense related considerations that can mitigate a
juvenile’s degree of culpability (level of participation, felony murder, and lack of specific
intent); (2) Sentencing considerations is a category reflecting factors considered by a judge
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these variables and the Kappa for the non-statutory mitigating circumstances
was (Kappa=.75, 3.80, p < .0001) which falls within the established range of
.61–.80 considered as substantial agreement in the literature.122
The coders also examined the sentencing transcripts to classify the types
of reasons judges gave to justify the sentences that they imposed. The second
phase of this coding process also involved reclassifying any reasons
represented in the transcripts to identify similar themes employed by judges
to explain the sentences they imposed. This phase resulted in eight themes
and five items that were not classified by the coders as fitting any specific
theme identified by the coders. The eight themes employed in the data
analyses for reasons were: nature of the crime; emotional aggravators;
dangerousness; criminal history; family environment; impulsivity; role in the
offense; and age/age attendant characteristics.123 The percentage agreement
when evaluating diminished culpability in selecting an appropriate sentence (remorse/grief,
sentencing disparity, immunity to other participants in the crime, and follower); (3) Mental
health considerations is a variable that reflects the fact that a juvenile had in their history
evidence of mental/emotional difficulties (history of mental health diagnosis, any psychiatric
medications prescribed, history of non-compliance with medications, evidence of unaddressed
counseling needs, and substance use history); (4) Brain/cognitive developmental
considerations is a variable measuring factors in a juvenile’s background associated with brain
and cognitive developmental considerations (history of head injuries, history of traumatic
brain injuries, mental retardation/cognitive disabilities, and brain development); (5) Family
environment refers to elements in the family context of a juvenile with implications for
attributions of culpability (difficult childhood, lack of role models, history of physical and
sexual abuse, exposure to gangs, and multiple changes in residences); (6) Social
connection/disconnected is a variable reflecting concerns about the youth’s degree of
connection or disconnection to relevant prosocial institutions (history of employment, good
character, and military history). See generally ADRIENNE L. FERNANDES & THOMAS GABE,
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R40535, DISCONNECTED YOUTH: A LOOK AT 16- TO 24-YEAR OLDS WHO
ARE NOT WORKING OR IN SCHOOL 7 (2009) (referring to disconnected youth as those who not
connected to pro-social institutions, which the social connection/disconnection variable
measures).
122
See Jacob Cohen, A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales, 20 EDUC. & PSYCH.
MEASUREMENT 37, 38–39 (1960), for established interpretation of ranges of the Kappa
statistic. Kappa is a measure of inter-rater-reliabilities that controls for chance agreement.
123
Then, we recategorized these items into specific themes. The themes identified by the
coders were: (1) Nature of the crime was the category that included phrases reflecting strong
moral outrage towards characteristics of the crime and traditional elements associated with
guilt phase culpability considerations for adults and juveniles (heinous crime, pecuniary gain,
age of victim, crime shocks the conscience, premeditated/willful, unprovoked violence, and
lack of premeditation); (2) Emotional aggravators includes phrases that capture emotionally
relevant sentencing considerations (devoid of empathy, lack of compassion, and lack of
remorse); (3) Dangerousness involves phrases associated with dangerousness (continued
dangerousness, danger to community, and history of violence); (4) Criminal history refers to
phrases associated with having committed offenses prior to the instant offense (lack of
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for these themes was 86% and the Kappa statistic had an almost perfect
degree of agreement when considering potential agreements due to chance
(Kappa=.85, 5.55, p <.0001).124
Some phrases were not included in any of the themes identified by the
coders. Consequently, they were examined separately during the data
analyses in order to determine their associations with the dependent variable
life sentences: mitigating factors don’t call for leniency; member of a gang;
emotional impact on victim’s family; Post Traumatic Stress Disorder
(PTSD); and brain development. In order to describe the contributions of age,
we also included two distinct measures: the abstract concept of age and age
and its attendant characteristics introduced in Miller described above.125 That
is, we examined three measures of age in assessing the extent to which age
was considered by judges: age as an abstract variable, age and attendant
characteristics identified as a theme by coders, and age as a reason for a
judge’s sentence. The study’s dependent variable was measured as a
dichotomous variable: natural life sentence and 25-to-life sentence.
E. DATA ANALYSIS DESIGN

The study employs descriptive statistics to determine the frequencies for
specific items that do not occur in the content of the documents. For purposes
of being conservative, the study only reports the percentages for any variable
criminal history, and extensive delinquency history); (5) Family environment referred to all
phrases associated with elements in the juvenile’s family life/family context (uncaring family,
dysfunctional family, lack of family support, family background, and history of abuse); (6)
Impulsivity involves phrases that reflect personally impulsive qualities (lack of impulse
control, evidence of impulsivity); (7) Role in offense refers to factors associated with the kinds
of consideration given to levels of participation in an offense at sentencing (level of
participation, presence of accomplice, and leadership role in offense); (8) Age/age attendant
characteristics is a theme that reflects substantive elements addressed in Miller to differentiate
between adults and juveniles (immaturity, age, possibility of rehabilitation, damaged goods,
behavior in custody, and brain development). Factors associated with possibility of
rehabilitation such as behavior in custody and damaged goods were included in this theme by
coders because these phrases have an association with judgements about the irreparable
corruption of youth, which are associated with concepts about rehabilitation emphasized in
Miller and Montgomery.
124
See Cohen, supra note 122, at 39–40.
125
We examine age as an independent characteristic because many judges merely
indicated age as a reason given in the justifications proffered for the selection of the type of
life sentence. Brain development had two yes responses, possibility of rehabilitation two yes
responses, and immaturity two yes responses. The cases studied from Maricopa County
involved “life” and natural life sentences levied after parole was eliminated in 1994. The cases
included for this study were roughly contemporaneous with the period when scientific
literature began to identify differences in culpability between juveniles and adults.
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with frequencies of five or more “yes” codes for characteristics of the
offense, statutory aggravating and statutory mitigating circumstances, nonstatutory mitigating circumstances, and for aggravating and mitigating
reasons judges reference in support of their sentencing decision.
For the quantitative analyses, we compute odds ratios to examine
associations between two nominal-level variables using SPSS Version 26.
Odds ratios are used to determine the relative odds of an outcome of interest
(life sentence) given the presence of a variable of interest. We also examine
the potential confounding variables with statistical associations with life
sentences by computing Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel tests.126 This statistical
test provides an estimate of an odds ratio for a variable of interest after
adjusting for a statistically relevant strata variable.
IV. FINDINGS
An examination of the characteristics of the offense described in Table
1 indicated that three variables had statistically significant associations with
pre-Miller life and natural life sentencing decisions: provocation,
impulsivity, and victim gender.127 Fifty-one percent of the cases had a code
indicating that the offense was provoked and sixty-three percent of the cases
were coded as impulsive. The odds of a natural life sentence for juveniles
were 84% less for an offense involving provocation than for an offense
without provocation. Whereas the odds were ninety percent less for a natural
life sentence when a juvenile offender’s offense was coded as impulsive as
opposed to when the offense was not coded as impulsive. The results in Table
1 also show that the odds of a natural life sentence were nine times more
likely if the victim was a female than if the victim was a male. Given the
contributions of the gender of the victim to the decision, the study treated this
variable as a potential confound for the purposes of this study. For this
reason, we performed Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel tests.
The results of the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel tests showed that the
statistical significance of the associations remained for the variables
provocation and impulsivity after controlling for the victim’s gender.128
126

See ALAN AGRESTI, AN INTRODUCTION TO CATEGORICAL DATA ANALYSIS 237 (3d ed.

2019).
127
The documents reviewed in this study lacked information about the race of the victim.
The researchers also examined news articles involving the crimes, but were unable to identify
sufficient information to include this variable in this study.
128
A test assumption for the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test is the homogeneity of the
Odds Ratio. The assumption is not met when the test is statistically significant at .05 level of
significance or below. The Cochran’s test is a test of conditional independence, which
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Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel tests were also performed to determine if gender
confounded the association between an impulsive offense and the dependent
variable life sentences. The results of these sets of analyses also showed that
the association between an impulsive offense and life sentences remained
after controlling for the influence of the gender of the victim.129 The effects
of minority/non-minority status on the associations among provocation,
impulsivity and the variable life sentences was also computed and these
results showed that the initial associations for the two offense characteristic
variables (provocation and impulsivity) were not confounded by the
minority/non-minority status variable.130 The only other offense
characteristic with a trend suggesting an association with life sentences was
the variable indicating that the prosecutor sought death in the case. When this
trend occurred, a natural life sentence was 2.5 times more likely than a
sentence of 25-to-life.

indicates that categorical groups differ in their association with a dichotomous categorical
outcome variable across the levels of a third categorical variable. That is, a statistically
significant finding indicates that the initial relationship remains after controlling for a third
variable. See Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel Conditional Independence of a Dichotomous
Categorical Outcome, SCALE, https://www.scalelive.com/cochran-mantel-haenszel.html
[https://perma.cc/D3Q9-3444]. For the provocation variable, the homogeneity of the odds was
not rejected (Breslow-Day Chi-Squared 1.78, p.=.18), but the null hypothesis is rejected for
the tests of conditional independence (Cochran’s Chi Squared, 4.25, p.=.04). Moreover, the
estimate of the common odds in this analysis showed a Mantel-Haenszel Common Odds Ratio
Estimate, 4.85, p.=.04. These findings indicate that the association for the provocation variable
remained after controlling for the gender of the victim, but some reduction in the odds was
noted from the original association.
129
The test assumption for the Cochran-Mantel-Haenszel test was not violated for the
impulsivity analysis because the Breslow Day assumption was met (Breslow Day ChiSquared, .346, p.=.56), and the Cochran’s test of conditional independence was significant
(Chi-Squared, 5.91, p.=.02). This finding plus the results of the Mantel-Haenszel Common
Odds Ratio Estimate, 7.91, p.=.03 indicated that the association between impulsivity and life
sentences was not confounded by the gender of the victim, but some reduction in the odds was
also noted for the original association for this variable.
130
The test’s assumptions for the minority/non-minority status variable were met for both
the Mantel-Haenszel tests performed on the provocation and impulsivity variables. The
Cochran’s test was statistically significant for the provocation variable (Cochran’s ChiSquared, 5.33, p.= .02) and for the impulsivity variable (Cochran’s Chi-Squared, 5.11, p.=.02).
Similarly, the Mantel-Haenszel Common Odds Ratio Estimate (Common Odds Ratio
Estimate, 4.97, p.=.03) for the minority-non-minority status variable and the Mantel Haenszel
Common Odds Ratio Estimate (Common Odds Ration Estimate, 7.47, p.=.04) for the
impulsivity variable indicated that the minority/non-minority status did not affect the initial
association for the provocation and impulsivity variables.
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Table 1
Percentages and Odds Ratios for Offense Characteristics with
Natural Life and 25-to-Life Sentences
(n=37)
Unadjusted
Bivariate
NL
25 to L
Variables
n (%)
n (%)
N
OR (95% CI)
p-value
Provocation
Yes
5 (27.8) 13 (72.2) 35 0.16 (.03-.70)
.01**
No 12 (70.6)
5 (29.4)
Impulsivity
Yes
8 (36.4) 14 (63.6) 37 0.10 (.01-.59)
.01**
No 11(84.6)
2 (15.4)
One perpetrator an adult
Yes
7 (53.8)
6 (46.2) 35 1.17 (.30-4.61)
.83
No 11(50.0) 11 (50.0)
Defendant only perpetrator
Yes
5 (45.5)
6 (54.5) 37 0.71 (.17-2.94)
.64
No 14 (53.8) 12 (46.2)
Defendant used Firearm
Yes 15 (51.7) 14 (48.3) 37 1.07 (.22-5.13)
.93
No
4 (50.0)
4 (50.0)
Attempted to kill more than one victim
Yes
6 (54.5)
5 (45.5) 37 1.20 (.29-4.94)
.80
No 13 (50.0) 13 (50.0)
Put others in harm’s way
Yes
6 (42.9)
8 (57.1) 37 0.57 (.15-2.21)
.42
No 13 (56.5) 10 (43.5)
Defendant knew victim
Yes
6 (50.0)
6 (50.0) 36 0.85 (.21-3.39)
.81
No 13 (54.2) 11(45.8)
Victim a stranger
Yes 12 (52.2) 11 (47.8) 37 1.09 (.29-4.12)
.90
No
7 (50.0)
7 (50.0)
Victim involved in illegal activity
Yes
6 (46.2)
7 (53.8) 36 0.59 (.15-2.36)
.46
No 13(59.1)
9 (40.9)
Victim gender
Female
7 (87.5)
1 (12.5) 37 9.92 (1.08-91.47)
.04**

2022] JUDICIAL RESPONSES TO AGE & OTHER MITIGATION

619

Male 12 (41.4) 17 (58.6)
Death sought by prosecutor
Yes
6 (66.7)
3 (33.3) 36 2.50 (.51-12.14)
.26
No 12 (44.4) 15 (55.6)
*=statistically significant at the .05 level of statistical significance
**= statistically significant at the .01 level of statistical significance
Table 2 describes the frequencies and associations for the statutory
aggravating and mitigating variables. The results show that none of the
statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances had a statistically
significant association with the dependent variable life sentences. It also
shows that judges found the statutory aggravator of pecuniary gain in 36% of
cases. Three of the other statutory aggravators were found by the judges in
15% of the cases: (1) especially heinous, cruel, or depraved; (2) convicted of
one or more homicides; and (3) created grave risks to others. Trends in the
data for these variables also showed a potential association among these
variables and the dependent variable life sentences. The statutory mitigating
variable “age” was found by the judges in 17% of the cases, but this variable
did not have a statistically significant association with the dependent variable
life sentences.
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Table 2
Percentages and Odds Ratios for Statutory Aggravators and
Statutory Mitigators with Natural Life and 25-to-Life Sentences
(n=37)
Unadjusted
Bivariate
NL
25 to L
Variables
n (%)
n (%)
N
OR (95% CI)
p-value
Statutory Aggravating variables
Knowingly created a Grave risk
Yes
4 (80)
1 (20) 33 3.47 (.34-35.06) .29
No
15 (53.6)
13 (46.4)
Pecuniary gain
Yes
9 (75)
3 (25) 33 3.30 (.69-15.74) .13
No
10 (47.6)
11 (52.4)
Heinous, cruel, or depraved
Yes
4 (80)
1 (20) 33 3.47 (.34-35.06) .29
No
15 (53.6)
13 (46.4)
Convicted of one or more homicide
Yes
3 (60)
2 (40) 33 1.13 (.17-7.82)
.12
No
16 (57.1)
12 (42.9)
Statutory Mitigating Variables
Age
Yes
1 (16.7)
5 (83.3) 35 .12 (.01-1.18)
.07
No
18 (62.1)
11(37.9)
None of the Statutory Aggravating and Mitigating factors had a statistical
association with the outcome natural life and 25-to-life sentences. One
variable was significant at the .1 level of significance. Four cases did not
have information on aggravating variables.
Table 3 describes the results for the non-statutory mitigating factors
found by judges. None of these variables had a statistically significant
association with the sentences imposed. The percentages of affirmative
findings by judges for non-statutory mitigating circumstances are: sentencing
disparity (8.8%); remorse grief (5.9%); mental retardation/intellectual
disability (5.9%); felony murder (14.7%); employment history (11.8%);
difficult childhood (5.9%); good character (5.9%); history of physical and
sexual abuse (5.9%); exposed to gangs (17.6%); any psychiatric medication
prescribed (11.8%); evidence of unaddressed counseling needs (8.8%); and
history of mental health diagnosis (8.8%).
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Clearly, judges found non-statutory mitigating circumstances in a small
percentage of the cases in Maricopa County. The few exceptions were the
cases with evidence of affirmative responses in 10% of the cases: felony
murder; exposed to gangs; and any psychiatric medications prescribed.
However, the trends for these variables did not suggest that they had any
associations with the variable life sentences. The variables that did show
potential associations with the study’s dependent variable were two variables
measuring the mitigating circumstances surrounding the commission of the
offense and two variables addressing social forms of advantage or its
converse disadvantage (family environment considerations and socially
connected/disconnected).
Table 3
Percentages and Odds Ratios for Non-Statutory Mitigating
Circumstances with Natural Life and 25-to-Life Sentences
(n=37)
Unadjusted
NL
25 to L
Bivariate
Variables
n (%)
n (%)
N
OR (95% CI)
p-value
Circumstances of the offense
Yes
4 (66.7)
2(33.3) 34 2.00 (.31-12.75)
.46
No
14 (50)
14 (50)
Sentencing considerations
Yes
6 (100)
0 (0) 34 17.16 (.88-334.11) .06
No 12 (42.9) 14 (57.1)
Mental Health Considerations
Yes
6 (60)
4 (40) 34 1.50 (.34-6.70)
.60
No
12 (50)
12 (50)
Brain/Cog-dev considerations
Yes
4 (57.1)
3 (42.9) 34 1.24 (.23-6.62)
.80
No 14 (51.9) 13 (48.1)
Family environment considerations
Yes
7 (70)
3 (30) 35 2.97 (.62-14.22)
.17
No
11 (44)
14 (56)
Socially Connected/Disconnected
Yes
6 (85.7)
1 (14.3) 34 7.50 (.79-71.09)
.08
No
12 (44)
15 (56)
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Table 4 describes the reasons proffered by judges for a sentencing
decision. The only reason for a sentence that had an association with the
study’s dependent variable was the variable measuring the emotional impact
on the victim’s family. The odds of a natural life sentence for this variable
were ten times more likely than when the variable was not given as a reason
for the sentence. We controlled for the effects of the victim’s gender on this
finding. When we did so, the test assumption for Cochran’s Mantel-Haenszel
test was met (Breslow-Day Chi-Squared .196, p.=.66) and the test of
conditional independence showed that there was a relationship (Cochran’s
3.932, p.=.05). However, we concluded that the finding for the common odds
ratio suggested that this association was confounded by the variable
measuring the victim’s gender on statistical significance criteria alone
(Common Odds Ratio Estimate =.12, p.=.08), but the direction of
percentages for the emotional impact of the family variable on life sentences
showed an association after controlling for the gender of the victim (87.5%
of the natural life sentences involved female victims versus 12.5% of the 25to-life cases).
The judges referenced the defendant’s age as one of their reasons for the
sentences imposed in 46% of the cases. We also examined the associations
among the defendant’s age (as a reason for the sentence) and the study’s
dependent variable. We found that the judges referenced this variable in 51%
of the cases. However, the findings in Table 4 show that neither of these agerelated variables had a statistically significant association with life sentences
nor percentages suggesting a trend in that direction.
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Table 4
Percentages and Odds Ratios for Judicial Reasons with Natural
Life and 25-to-Life Sentences
(n=37)
Unadjusted
Bivariate
NL
25 to L
Variables
n (%)
n (%)
N
OR (95% CI)
p-value
Emotional Aggravators
Yes
6 (75)
2 (25) 34 3.23 (.55-18.96)
.19
No 13 (48.1) 14 (51.9)
Dangerousness
Yes
6 (75)
2 (25) 35 3.23 (.55-18.96)
.19
No 13 (48.1) 14 (51.9)
Criminal History
Yes
4 (66.7)
2 (33.3) 35 1.87 (.29-11.84)
.52
No 15 (51.7) 14 (48.3)
Family Environment Considerations
Yes
7 (70)
3 (30) 35 2.53 (.53-12.07)
.24
No
12 (48)
13 (52)
Nature of the Crime
Yes
9 (52.9)
8 (47.1) 35 0.90 (.24-3.41)
.88
No 10 (55.6)
8 (44.4)
Rehabilitation Considerations
Yes
1 (50)
1 (50) 34 0.78 (.05-13.56)
.86
No 18 (56.3) 14 (43.8)
Role in Offense
Yes
2 (66.7)
1 (33.3) 35 1.77 (.15-21.48)
.66
No 17 (53.1) 15 (46.9)
Age attendant Characteristics
Yes
10 (48)
11 (52) 35 0.51 (.13-2.03)
.34
No
9 (64.7)
5 (35.3)
Defendant’s Age
Yes
8 (50)
8 (50) 35 0.55 (.14-2.20)
.40
No 11 (57.9)
6 (42.1)
Emotional impact on victim’s family
Yes
8 (88.9)
1 (11.1) 34 10.18 (1.10-94.11) .04*
No
11 (44)
14 (56)
*= statistically significant at the .05 level of significance.
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We also examined statistical associations with the variable age and the
following variables: provocation (Phi=.28, p.=.11), impulsivity (Phi=.11, p.=
.52), gender of the victim (Phi=-.18, p.=.28), and the emotional impact on the
victim (Phi=-.03, p.=.86). These findings showed that there were no
statistically significant associations among the defendant’s age as a reason
for the sentence and the variables showing statistically significant odds for
the study’s dependent variable.
CONCLUSION
Our study’s sample size did not allow for an examination of the weight
given by judges to age and other mitigation evidence when selecting
appropriate sentences. However, it did allow for examining whether
variables referencing reasons for life sentences had statistically significant
associations or trending percentages with judicial reasons for sentences and
the sentences imposed. We assumed that if the judges’ reasons lacked
evidence of associations with the study’s dependent variable, that these
findings raised questions about whether judges were making pro forma
references about age and other relevant mitigation evidence in making their
sentencing decisions. We also assumed that the descriptive trends in the types
of associations among the study’s variables had implications for
understanding whether the judicial reasons for juvenile life sentences
reflected a restricted view of juvenile blameworthiness.
The only judicial reason for a sentence that had a statistically significant
relationship with the study’s dependent variable was the variable “emotional
impact of the crime on the victim’s family.” This finding indicated that the
consequences of the sentence on the victim’s family was a focal concern in
Maricopa County when judges selected an appropriate sentence. In fact, the
judges were ten times more likely to impose a natural life sentence when they
considered this concern than when imposing a sentence of 25-to-life.
Additionally, there were four trending variables in a direction suggesting
associations between the reasons given by judges and the sentences they
imposed: emotional aggravators, dangerousness, criminal history, and family
considerations.
Three of these factors (emotional aggravators, dangerousness, and
criminal history) reflected two key concerns affecting judicial decisions in
the theory of focal concerns—culpability/blameworthiness and
dangerousness. This finding suggested that the judges were not just relying
on the emotional consequences of their sentencing decision on the victim’s
family, but also concerns germane to an offender’s culpability and
dangerousness. However, the operationalization of blameworthiness in the
theory of focal concerns places minimal attention on factors involving
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mitigating circumstances. Yet, the judges in Maricopa County did reference
family environment considerations as a mitigating circumstance in 70% of
the cases when judges imposed a natural life sentence.
Nonetheless, the findings for the variable “family environment
circumstances” introduced some challenges for interpretation. These findings
introduced a relevant question surrounding observed trends in the data
because the percentages for the responses went in an unexpected direction.
The directions were unexpected because mitigating circumstances should
have had a closer association with less harsh sentences than natural life or
JLWOP sentences given the role of mitigating circumstances in criminal law
doctrine and theory.131
The prior findings and the judges’ treatment of age suggested that the
judges’ justifications for their sentences were adhering to what Scott and
Steinberg have termed in the legal literature a “full-responsibility” approach
to juvenile sentencing.132 Scott and Steinberg in their article Blaming Youth
introduced “a broader framework of criminal law doctrine and theory” for
the blaming of juvenile offenders that assumed that immaturity should be
considered a special status and treated as a mitigator of juvenile
blameworthiness.133 Their approach was subsequently included in the
Roper134 decision and its progeny.135 Yet, the results of this study were
equivocal about the extent to which judges in Arizona were correct in
rejecting post-conviction claims following the Miller decision on the grounds
that judges had considered age in selecting an appropriate sentence in their
pre-Miller decisions.
The judges referenced age in 46% of the cases, and age and its attendant
characteristics in 51% of the cases. However, none of these variables had a
statistically significant association with their sentencing decisions, and the
trends for each of these variables did not suggest an association between agerelated variables and the sentences that the judges imposed. Given the fact
that the results for age-related factors were essentially equivalent across the
kinds of sentences imposed, we could not conclude that the age-related
variables were not considered, but we also could not rule out the possibility
that the judges treated the variable age in a pro forma manner. Nonetheless,
it is also important to reiterate a prior point that the only mitigating reasons
131

Scott & Steinberg, supra note 82, at 800.
Id.
133
Id.
134
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569–70 (2005).
135
E.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 72–73, 77–78 (2010); Miller v. Alabama, 567
U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733–34 (2016).
132
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associated with the sentences selected by judges in the juvenile context were
equally appropriate for the sentences for an adult. For this reason, the results
of the study did not show that the judges were adhering to a mitigation
approach for age when evaluating the blameworthiness of juvenile offenders
as introduced by Scott and Steinberg.136
This study not only examined the reasons for judicial decisions, but also
factors that might influence the judges’ selection of appropriate life
sentences. To this end, we examined judicial references to the presence of
statutorily defined aggravators and mitigators during the sentencing
proceedings. While none of these aggravating and mitigating circumstances
had statistically significant associations with the study’s dependent variable,
trends were evident in the data that four offense-related aggravators had
associations with natural life sentences. The results in these analyses also
showed that the odds of a sentence of 25-to-life was higher when judges made
a statutory finding of age as a mitigating circumstance even though this
finding was not statistically significant.
However, the judges made an explicit finding of age as a statutory
mitigating factor in 17% of the cases. The fact that 17% of the cases have a
judicial finding of age as a mitigating factor raises a number of questions. Is
this a reasonable percentage given the fact that age is recognized as a
statutory mitigating circumstance in Arizona and other states? Moreover, this
finding does not correspond with the percentages for the reasons given by
judges for the sentences they impose: 46% for age as an abstract variable and
51% for the variable age and its attendant considerations as a reason for the
sentences. Nonetheless, this discrepancy provided some evidence that the
reasons judges give for their sentences might be due to factors that are not
directly associated with their final decisions. For this reason, future studies
will need to investigate the respective weight given by judges for statutorily
defined aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The size of the population
in Maricopa County was not sufficient for carrying out this type of
investigation.
Non-statutory variables also lacked statistically significant associations
with the dependent variable life sentences. However, trends in the “yes”
responses indicated that natural life sentences were more likely when judges
referenced the mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense rather than
personally mitigating factors. The prior findings showed that the
organizational field and/or court culture in Maricopa County, Arizona was
adhering to classical theories of crime and punishment that focus primarily
on the seriousness of the offense without considering the characteristics of
136

See generally Scott & Steinberg, supra note 82, at 800.
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the offender. That is, we did not uncover any evidence to suggest that the
judges were actually considering personally mitigating factors in making
their sentencing decisions because none of the personally mitigating factors
mentioned by judges at sentencing were associated with their decisions.
Moreover, these findings also indicated that the court culture in Maricopa
County adhered to a different precept from the Eighth Amendment mandate
of criminal justice that punishments should be “graduated and proportioned
to both the offender and the offense.”137
Another group of factors that had potential to influence sentencing
decisions were the characteristics of the offense. Three of the offense
characteristics had statistically significant associations with the study’s
dependent variable: provocation, impulsivity, and the victim’s gender. Two
of these variables (provocation and impulsivity) raised some interesting
questions because criminal law doctrine and theory suggests these offense
variables are considered less blameworthy when compared to planned
offenses with bad, heinous, or depraved motivations. Consequently, such
variables are recognized by legal scholars as reasonable factors for making a
sentencing decision, but not necessarily within the frame for sentencing
juveniles as described in Miller.138 Nonetheless, if judges consider
impulsivity and provocation independent of associations with age, then we
assumed that it was difficult to conclude that they are recognizing the
constitutional differences between juveniles and adults as prescribed in
Miller. Furthermore, “Graham insists that youth matters in determining the
appropriateness of a lifetime of incarceration without the possibility of
parole. In the circumstances there, juvenile status precluded a life-withoutparole sentence, even though an adult could receive it for a similar crime.”139
With this reasoning in mind, we were unable to conclude from the findings
137

Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012) (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Paul Litton, Is Psychological Research on Self-Control Relevant to Criminal
Law?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 725, 729–30, 745–46 (2014) (referring to mental states
reflecting differences between manslaughter as a sudden homicide versus purposeful
premeditated homicides); Richard Singer, The Resurgence of Mens Rea: I—Provocation,
Emotional Disturbance and the Model Penal Code, 27 B.C. L. REV. 243, 247–48, 251 (1986)
(showing the resurgence in the Model Penal Code of considering the nexus between retribution
and mens rea (subjective or mental culpability), which has implications for selecting
appropriate sanctions). These legal authorities recognize that a core predicate in retributive
sentencing is the proportionality of the punishment to the moral and mental culpability of the
offender. Differences between sudden and premediated homicides reflect different mental
states. When sentencing capital and juvenile lifer cases, the mental state is not included in an
objective definition of the type or level of homicide committed by the offender, but instead it
reflects the specific motivations of the offender for committing the crime.
139
Miller, 567 U.S. at 473.
138
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of this study that judges examined whether the crime reflected a juvenile’s
diminished culpability, because provocation and impulsivity share
fundamental characteristics with how judges also would assess questions of
blameworthiness for similar crimes committed by adults.
Arizona case law contains a number of court decisions that justify
judicial sentences on the grounds that the mitigation evidence lacked a
connection with the crime.140 However, the study did not note any evidence
in its analysis of the content in the files of pre-Miller cases that the reasons
given for not considering age was the fact that it lacked a nexus with the
crime. There was evidence, however, of content in 9% of the cases where
judges said that the mitigating factors did not call for leniency. But the judges
did not provide moral reasons for why the diminished culpability or
blameworthiness of the juvenile was not sufficiently substantial to warrant a
less harsh sentence. These and the other findings about the treatment of age
provided further support for the conclusion in Montgomery that the way in
which age was treated by justices in Arizona and other jurisdictions was not
sufficient for addressing the substantive changes in Miller for sentencing
juvenile lifers.
In this study, we did not expect to find the lack of attention given by
judges to concerns involving rehabilitation because of the emphasis placed
on questions of amenability to treatment and rehabilitation in the landmark
juvenile decision of Kent v. United States.141 In Kent, judges were given
guidelines when considering to waive a juvenile to adult court that included
questions about the rehabilitation of the juvenile within the juvenile justice
system.142 Indeed, Kent introduced the important principle that the juvenile
justice system’s jurisdiction can be waived if the juvenile is not amendable
to treatment or rehabilitation in the juvenile justice system.143 Consequently,
one could have assumed that some judges would have considered some
aspect of a juvenile’s willingness and capacity for rehabilitation when
imposing a life or natural life sentence.
While the low frequencies for some of the variables examined in this
study introduced obvious limitations surrounding questions of statistical
power, a factor that offers some compensation for this limitation was the fact
that this descriptive study’s sample is reasonably representative of the
population of pre-Miller cases processed by the judges in Maricopa
140
See, e.g., McKinney v. Ryan, 813 F.3d 798, 802 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc); see also
Atiq & Miller, supra note 17, at 170.
141
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 567 (1966).
142
Id. at 566–67.
143
Id.
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County.144 For this reason, we assumed that the study’s descriptive results
allowed for reasonable generalizations about the range and types of age and
non-age-related forms of mitigation contained in the juvenile life case files
in Maricopa County.
There was a lack of compelling evidence in this study that judges
considered age as evidence of mitigation and diminished culpability during
sentencing for serious crimes. For this reason, future research should focus
on examining resentencing and new sentencing processes for juvenile lifers
in communities with restrictive interpretations of mitigation evidence to
determine the extent to which Montgomery has modified how judges
consider age and other forms of mitigation evidence when sentencing
juveniles to life sentences. The findings of this study also have implications
for policy makers because many legal statutes only identify age as a potential
mitigating factor without providing sentencing authorities with guidelines
containing indicators of the mitigating characteristics of age and its attendant
characteristics. This vague treatment of age as a mitigating circumstance in
many statutes can lead to disproportionate sentences for juvenile lifers
because judges are at increased risk in some court communities for ignoring
the important constitutional differences between juveniles and adults
described in Roper and its progeny.

144
See supra Section III.C (indicating that 82% of pre-Miller juveniles serving natural life
sentences in Maricopa County consented to participating in the authors’ study).

